SMITH 1-9-06 FINAL.DOC

1/9/2006 4:51:59 PM

THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO PUBLIC FORUMS:
DOES A FAILURE TO REQUIRE THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE
ALTERNATIVE RESULT IN A FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE?
Whitney M. Smith ∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States of America offers its citizens broad protec1
tions for speech. Of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights, free
2
speech is one of our most important. Extensive scholarship offers
3
four main theories justifying the right of free speech.
First, free speech is necessary for self-government and democ4
racy. It is vital to our ability to self-govern, because this freedom
allows the dissemination of information about politics and policies
5
among voters. In order for voters to arrive at the correct public policy and ultimately choose the correct candidate, the free exchange of
6
ideas is vital. Some scholars have argued that in order for a democ-
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1
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment states: “Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” Id.
2
See Christopher J. Peters, Adjudicative Speech and the First Amendment, 51 UCLA
L. REV. 705, 742 (2004) (citing the Free Speech Clause as one of the most important
provisions of the Constitution).
3
Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 130–55 (1989)
(categorizing, explaining and challenging the accuracy and value of each of the different justifications).
4
Id. at 148 (“No doubt valid consent to something can often be based on less
than full information, but a problem arises when the authority that seeks consent
also controls available information. If someone asks my agreement to a course of action and then actively conceals much relevant information that would affect my
judgment, my ‘consent’ is of lessened or no effect.”).
5
Id.
6
Id.
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racy to function and for self-government to be effective, there can be
7
no restrictions on the right of free speech.
A second justification advanced for the protection of speech is
8
that the free exchange of ideas allows the truth to emerge. In his
9
dissent in Abrams v. United States, Justice Holmes coined the term
“marketplace of ideas,” arguing that the ultimate test of an idea, regardless of whether it was right or true, was whether it was accepted
10
Thus,
above other ideas, which had an equal right to be heard.
many consider free speech vital to the discovery of truth, and phi11
losophers as well as legal scholars embrace this idea.
A third justification for free speech is that it is necessary for
12
autonomy.
Allowing people to freely express themselves allows
13
them to define themselves, which in and of itself has value. Finally,
scholars argue that the First Amendment right to freedom of speech
14
promotes tolerance. Permitting citizens to engage in the speech of
15
their choice encourages tolerance of diverse viewpoints.
Although these theories overlap in some areas, most scholars
16
agree on the importance of free speech to self-government. Thus,

7

See, e.g., Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT.
REV. 245 (arguing that there should be no limits on the First Amendment, even on
private speech such as art and literature, because although such speech does not develop political knowledge, it helps voters acquire intelligence).
8
Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 130.
9
250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
10
Id. at 630 (arguing “that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market”).
11
See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 76 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin
Books 1982) (1859) (arguing that suppressing speech deprives men of the truth of
an idea, or if the idea is false, the ability to compare this false idea with the truth in
order to gain perception).
12
Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 143 (“By affording people an opportunity to hear
and digest competing positions and to explore options in conversations with others,
freedom of discussion is thought to promote independent judgment and considerate
decision, what might be characterized as autonomy.”).
13
See generally Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591
(1982) (arguing that the sole value of the First Amendment is its role in selfrealization, a process by which an individual realizes his potential or commands his
destiny).
14
Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 146–47 (“The basic idea is that if we are forced to
acknowledge the right of detested groups to speak, we are taught the lesson that we
should be tolerant of the opinions and behavior of those who are not like us.”).
15
Id.
16
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 11.1.2
(2d ed. 2002).
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political speech is generally accorded the greatest protection possible
17
under the First Amendment.
Nevertheless, courts have recognized some restrictions on the
18
right of free speech, even political speech. First Amendment jurisprudence struggles with drawing appropriate lines as to which speech
19
is protected and which is not. As security concerns have increased
in the last decade, the desire to feel safe has led to the sacrifice of
some First Amendment protections. Federal courts have repeatedly
confronted the issue of balancing the right of free speech with pro20
viding a safe environment in the last two decades. This conflict has
arisen pursuant to protests of many issues, including abortion, war,
21
and our current president.
This Comment focuses on the extent to which security concerns
have limited the free access to public forums for speech and altered
judicial standards for restrictions on speech. Part II presents the current law on the right of access in public forums, and Part III explores
the causes for increasing concerns for security. In Part IV, this Comment describes the approach taken to protect abortion clinics, while
still allowing for maximum protection of protesters’ First Amendment freedoms. Part V explores the recent problems stemming from
the application of the current standard to First Amendment challenges for political speech in public forums. Part VI applies the
standard set forth in First Amendment challenges by protesters at
abortion clinics to recent case law and determines the difference in
outcome that a more protective standard produces. Part VII concludes by urging the implementation of a standard that is more
protective of speech than current law by requiring the government to
justify the restrictions it places on access to public forums by demonstrating that it has chosen the least restrictive alternative to advance
its security concern.

17

Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 313–15 (1992) (“The
belief that politics lies at the core of the amendment is an outgrowth of the more
general structural commitment to deliberative democracy. The concern for ensuring
the preconditions for deliberation among the citizenry is closely associated with this
commitment.”).
18
See infra notes 31–34 and accompanying text.
19
See infra notes 36–38 and accompanying text.
20
See infra notes 124–81 and accompanying text.
21
Id.
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF JURISPRUDENCE RESTRICTING ACCESS
TO PUBLIC FORUMS—THE “TIME, PLACE
AND MANNER” STANDARD
Supreme Court opinions that deal with the issue of access to
public forums underscore the notion that this right is necessary to fa22
cilitate effective self-government.
Earlier opinions reflected the
notion that free access to public forums was a basic right of citizen23
24
ship. In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, the Court
declared unconstitutional a New Jersey statute that required the ap25
The
proval of a local police chief for leasing any hall or space.
government enforced this law to prevent members of the Communist
26
party from holding meetings. Justice Roberts wrote a plurality opinion and invalidated the law, writing that places such as halls and parks
should belong to the people:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out
of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.
Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times,
been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of
citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the
streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but
relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general
comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and
good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be
27
abridged or denied.

The Court recognized the importance of the right of free assembly in
public places, but also acknowledged that the right of such assembly
28
could be limited at times. Later Supreme Court decisions would
29
struggle with the appropriate limits to place on this freedom.

22

See infra notes 23–41 and accompanying text.
See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 501 (1939) (addressing the
constitutionality of a New Jersey statute that prohibited citizens from meeting in public spaces without the permission of the local government).
24
307 U.S. 496 (1939).
25
Id. at 516.
26
Id. at 501.
27
Id. at 515.
28
Id. at 516.
29
See infra notes 31–41 and accompanying text.
23
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In 1941, only two years after the Hague decision, the Supreme
30
Court in Cox v. New Hampshire upheld a statute challenged by a
group of Jehovah’s Witnesses wishing to hold a parade and pass out
31
materials. The Court enunciated the standard by which constitutional challenges to restrictions on access to public forums would be
measured:
If a municipality has authority to control the use of its public
streets for parades or processions, as it undoubtedly has, it cannot
be denied authority to give consideration, without unfair discrimination, to time, place and manner in relation to the other
proper uses of the streets. We find it impossible to say that the
limited authority conferred by the licensing provisions of the statute in question as thus construed by the state court contravened
32
any constitutional right.

Thus, the Cox Court crafted the standard that restrictions on speech
in public places were constitutional as long as the restrictions were
33
reasonable with regard to time, place, and manner. Once the Court
determined that the ability to regulate the use of places such as
streets, parks, and other public forums was properly within the State’s
power, it adopted a deferential standard to the State’s judgment in
34
such matters.
The Supreme Court refined the test over the years, but even with
the refinements the Court remained deferential to restrictions on the
use of parks and other public forums. In Clark v. Community for Crea35
tive Non-Violence, the Court upheld the National Park Service’s
decision to prohibit protestors from sleeping in parts of Lafayette
36
Park, as a demonstration against the plight of the homeless. The
majority opinion, authored by Justice White, reiterated the standard
37
for restrictions on speech. The Court reaffirmed that reasonable
38
time, place, and manner restrictions were proper. The Court, however, clarified the additional requirements that the regulations of
speech could not be content-based, that they must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and that there be

30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

312 U.S. 569 (1941).
Id. at 570–71.
Id. at 576.
Id.
Id.
468 U.S. 288 (1984).
Id. at 289.
Id. at 293.
Id.
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39

alternative channels for communication of the information. While
this could be viewed as an expansion in speech protection, Justices
Brennan and Marshall pointed out, in dissent, the inadequacy of this
40
protection. The Justices argued that once a regulation is found to
be content-neutral, the level of scrutiny is minimal, offering little pro41
tection for important forms of speech.
While the Court’s constitutional standard for permit and guideline schemes looks at whether the regulation is narrowly tailored,
under current authority the State does not need to employ the least
42
restrictive alternative to advance its legitimate concerns. In fact, the
Court expressly stated that it does not require such a showing for a
43
regulation to pass constitutional muster. In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, an association, Rock Against Racism (RAR), dedicated to the
promotion of anti-racist views, challenged a New York City guideline
44
that controlled the volume of sound amplification at public events.
Due to problems with excessive noise in the past, the City’s guidelines
controlled sound amplification for events at Naumberg Bandshell,
45
where the RAR event was to take place. RAR sought an injunction
46
that would permit it to use its own equipment and technician. In
47
The district
prior years, the City permitted RAR this autonomy.
48
court denied the injunction, but the Second Circuit reversed.
Although the guideline was content-neutral, served a significant
governmental interest, and left open ample alternative channels of
communication, the Second Circuit struck down the guideline because the City had not used the least restrictive alternative for
49
controlling the sound volume at the event. In reversing the Second
39

Id.
See id. at 301 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
41
Clark, 468 U.S. at 313 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[b]y narrowly
limiting its concern to whether a given regulation creates a content-based distinction,
the Court has seemingly overlooked the fact that content-neutral restrictions are also
capable of unnecessarily restricting protected expressive activity”).
42
See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
43
Id. at 782.
44
Id. at 787.
45
Id. at 785. The guideline provided that the “Department of Parks and Recreation is to be the sole and only provider of sound amplification, including though not
limited to amplifiers, speakers, monitors, microphones, and processors.” Id. at 788.
46
Id. at 787–88.
47
Ward, 491 U.S. at 787.
48
Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 848 F.2d 367, 372 (2d Cir. 1988).
49
Id. at 370 (holding that the guideline “must be the least intrusive upon the
freedom of expression as is reasonably necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose of
the regulation” and offering several less restrictive methods of achieving the City’s
goal).
40
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Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court held that its test did not require use of the least restrictive alternative when regulating speech in
public forums:
The requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied so long as
the regulation promotes a substantial governmental interest
that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation,
and the means chosen are not substantially broader than
necessary to achieve that interest. If these standards are
met, courts should defer to the government’s reasonable
50
determination.
Thus, the Court held that when hearing challenges based on access
to public forums, courts need not inquire whether the government’s
51
objective could be accomplished in a less restrictive manner.
In dissent, Justice Marshall argued that the Court had signifi52
cantly lessened the constitutional protection for speech.
Justice
Marshall was concerned that the majority’s opinion articulated a new
standard for the protection of speech that replaced scrutiny with
53
“mandatory deference.” Furthermore, he reasoned that if the lower
courts should no longer inquire whether the goals of the regulation
could be achieved in a less intrusive manner, they would be unable to
determine whether the government had adopted a regulation that
54
burdened more speech than necessary.
Thus, the “time, place, and manner” standard does not require
55
strict scrutiny by the courts. Only when there are no standards for
issuing permits for public forums and the permit scheme is left fully
to the discretion of a public official should a court apply strict scru56
This additional requirement of
tiny to a restriction on speech.
actual, set standards for the issuance of permits affords more protection for speech, but after Ward, there is no requirement that the
government employ the least restrictive alternative to achieve its objectives.

50

Ward, 491 U.S. at 782–83 (syllabus).
Id.
52
Id. at 803 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
53
Id.
54
Id. at 807.
55
Id. at 800 (majority opinion).
56
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 153 (1969) (“Even when
the use of its public streets and sidewalks is involved, therefore, a municipality may
not empower its licensing officials to roam essentially at will, dispensing or withholding permission to speak, assemble, picket, or parade according to their own opinions
regarding the potential effect of the activity in question on the ‘welfare,’ ‘decency,’
or ‘morals’ of the community.”).
51
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III. THE RISE OF SECURITY CONCERNS
In Ward, the Supreme Court left no doubt that lower courts
need not require use of the least restrictive alternative in order to
57
uphold a government restriction of free access to a public forum.
More recent events have generated an increase in anxiety over large
protests, leading to a heightened desire to control or prevent such
58
demonstrations from taking place.
Although many cite the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11) as
the cause of increased security concerns regarding access to public
forums for demonstrations and protests, anxiety about safety pre59
dated 9/11. More than any other event in the last half-century, or
quite likely any event in the history of this nation, however, the events
of 9/11 have increased the cause for security concerns. These events
have dominated discussions of safety, and prevention of another terrorist attack is paramount in any regulation or restriction on access to
a public forum. Still, 9/11 brought a climax to the already growing
anxiety over safety.
For example, in Seattle, Washington in late 1999, the protests
60
against the World Trade Organization (WTO) summit threw the
61
city into chaos. The protest drew together many different organizations and constituencies to demonstrate and disrupt the meetings of
62
the world’s most influential trade-governing bodies.
The WTO summit in Seattle began on November 29, 1999, and
63
the protests began that same day. Over 1400 organizations joined
the protests, viewing the talks as a tool for the wealthy to eliminate
64
jobs. The protests lasted for five full days and eventually disrupted
the summit on December 3, 1999. The protests closed the central
business district of Seattle and effected a great deal of damage and

57

Ward, 491 U.S. at 782.
See infra notes 59–77 and accompanying text.
59
See infra notes 60–77 and accompanying text.
60
The World Trade Organization is an international body that promulgates rules
dealing with trade among nations. World Trade Organization, What is the WTO?,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm (last visited Dec. 21,
2005).
61
The WTO History Project, WTO History Project, http://depts.washington.
edu/wtohist/index.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2005).
62
The WTO History Project, Day One: November 29, 1999, http://depts.washing
ton.edu/wtohist/day1.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2005)
63
The WTO History Project, About the Project, http://depts.washington.edu/
wtohist/about_project.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2005).
64
The WTO History Project, Introduction to the Protests, http://depts.washing
ton.edu/wtohist/intro.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2005).
58
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65

destruction on the city. The protests also exposed the Seattle police
force’s lack of adequate preparation for managing the planned dem66
onstration. There was also massive public outrage at the tactics the
police used to control the protesters, which included clearing crowds
67
with tear gas. These tactics elicited increasingly violent and destruc68
tive responses from the protesters. As the days passed, the police
arrested growing numbers of protesters, until nearly 600 people were
69
jailed. The summit was eventually cancelled, due to the destruction
and violence in the city, compounded by the Seattle Police Depart70
ment’s inability to protect the WTO dignitaries’ safety.
Also prior to 9/11, increasing concern for security arose in reaction to the continued violence at abortion clinics. Although clinics
are more physically permanent targets than the WTO summit, the
continuing incidents of violence involving them underscore concerns
71
for safety.
Abortion has been a major political issue since 1973,
when the Supreme Court determined that abortion was a fundamen72
Since the Roe decision, opposition to
tal right in Roe v. Wade.
abortion has grown more zealous causing increased incidents of vio73
74
lence on abortion clinics, including bombings and fires.
In other instances, abortion protesters were able to “blockade”
the clinics by having enough demonstrators present at the clinic to
75
completely prevent access to it. In Cherry Hill, New Jersey, a blockade of this nature was successful in overwhelming police and other
76
law enforcement officials and shutting the clinic down for a day.
These violent and zealous demonstrations are not only intimidating
77
and disruptive, but they are expensive as well. Situations such as
65

The WTO History Project, Repercussions, http://depts.washington.edu/wtoh
ist/Repercussions.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2005).
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
The WTO History Project, Day Five: December 3, 1999, http://depts.washingt
on.edu/wtohist/day5.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2005).
70
Id.
71
See infra notes 73–77 and accompanying text.
72
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
73
Stephen J. Hedges et al., Abortion: Who’s Behind the Violence?, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Nov. 14, 1994, at 50.
74
Id.
75
Fay Clayton & Sara N. Love, NOW v. Scheidler: Protecting Women’s Access to Reproductive Health Services, 62 ALB. L. REV. 967, 977 (1999).
76
Id. at 987.
77
See, e.g., Hedges et. al., supra note 73, at 55 (documenting the cost of each
bombing or other violent act against a clinic, the minimum of which is $300,000 and
in some instances may exceed $1 million).
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these caused many states to begin enacting “buffer zones” around
clinics to help ensure the safety of clinic personnel and patients.
These zones were soon challenged as violations of First Amendment
78
freedoms.
IV. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO THE SECURITY ISSUES
AT ABORTION CLINICS
Due to the concern about increasing incidents of violence at
abortion clinics, Congress enacted the Freedom of Access to Clinic
79
Entrances Act (FACE). States also enacted legislation and utilized
other tools to offer protection to abortion clinics and patients seeking
80
services at these facilities. Abortion protesters challenged the limits
placed on demonstrations outside clinics as violative of their First
Amendment rights.
A. The Madsen Test
When anti-abortion demonstrations outside clinics continued to
have a negative effect on the clinics and the women trying to access
them, a Florida court issued an injunction that established a thirty-sixfoot buffer zone around the clinic, enjoining demonstrators from
81
coming within a certain distance of the clinics.
The injunction,
which was later broadened to provide more protection for the clin82
ics, was challenged in Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc. as a
83
violation of the demonstrators’ rights under the First Amendment.
The Court first noted that its traditional time, place, and manner test
for restrictions on speech would not provide the scrutiny this case required because the restriction challenged was an injunction, rather
84
than an ordinance. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, reasoned that an injunction differs from a statute or ordinance
85
and therefore carries a greater risk of censorship. First, unlike an
78

See infra notes 79–117 and accompanying text.
18 U.S.C. § 248 (2000) (providing penalties for anyone who attempts to
threaten or intimidate an individual who endeavors to procure reproductive services).
80
For example, Colorado passed legislation protecting access to clinics, which
was later challenged. See infra notes 112–17.
81
Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 757 (1994).
82
Id. at 758.
83
Id. at 753.
84
Id. at 765 (“Accordingly, when evaluating a content-neutral injunction, we
think that our standard time, place, and manner analysis is not sufficiently rigorous.”).
85
Id. at 764.
79
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ordinance, an injunction is a judicial decree and not a reflection of a
86
policy choice by the legislature. Next, because a judge crafts an in87
junction, there is a greater risk of discriminatory enforcement.
Because of this increased risk of censorship, the Court applied a
more stringent analysis to the injunction, and it inquired “whether
the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech
88
than necessary to serve a significant government interest.”
In the Court’s analysis of the injunction, this heightened scrutiny
played a critical role in the Court’s decision to strike down portions
89
of the injunction, while upholding others.
First, the Court addressed the thirty-six-foot buffer zone around the clinic, an area
within which protesters were prohibited from protesting and picket90
ing. The Court upheld this portion of the injunction while noting
that the protesters would still be seen and heard from areas outside
91
the buffer zone. Because the protesters still had the ability to make
their message heard, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that this aspect of the injunction burdened no more speech than necessary to
92
The majority also upheld the
achieve the government’s interest.
Florida court’s ban on sound amplification devices, as well as chanting and other such forms of protest to prevent noise-levels around
93
the clinic from getting too high. The Court again determined that
these restrictions burdened no more speech than was necessary to
achieve the government’s objective of ensuring the health and safety
94
of the clinic’s patients.
Under this heightened standard of review, however, the majority
also found that certain portions of the injunction burdened more
95
speech than was necessary to achieve the government’s objectives.
The Florida state court placed a ban on all “images observable” out96
side the clinic in order to stop threats to patients and their families.
The Supreme Court, however, determined that the state court could

86

Id.
Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764.
88
Id. at 765.
89
Id. at 768–76.
90
Id. at 768.
91
Id. at 770 (“Protesters standing across the narrow street from the clinic can still
be seen and heard from the clinic parking lots.”).
92
Id.
93
Madsen, 512 U.S. at 772.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 773.
96
Id.
87
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have prohibited threats, rather than all such images.
Thus, the
98
Court found this provision to burden more speech than necessary.
The Madsen Court also struck down a provision of the injunction
that prohibited protesters from physically approaching any person
entering the clinic unless such person initiated an interaction or
99
showed a desire to interact first. Again, the majority held that such
a prohibition was too broad a measure to prevent intimidation and
that the same end could be achieved through narrower and less re100
Finally, under this standard of review, the Court
strictive means.
struck down a prohibition on protesting and demonstrating within
101
The majority once again de300 feet of the clinic staff’s homes.
termined that there was a narrower way of accomplishing the stated
goal of achieving tranquility and peace at the homes of these indi102
viduals.
Only under this heightened level of scrutiny does the Court determine whether the government’s objectives could be accomplished
in a less restrictive manner. The Court applied this more rigorous
test due to the dangers of an injunction burdening more speech than
necessary. The Court found that these dangers were greater in the
103
context of an injunction, rather than an ordinance.
If the Court
simply used the “time, place, and manner” standard, the only question for the Court would have been whether the restriction was
reasonable and would have scrutinized the restriction only under its
rational basis review. Under a more traditional analysis, once a court
concludes that the restriction was reasonable and the government’s
objective important, it should look no further to see if the goal could
be accomplished through less restrictive means.
B. After Madsen
The constitutionality of placing limits on protesters’ ability to
demonstrate outside of abortion clinics was revisited by the Supreme
97

Id.
Id.
99
Madsen, 512 U.S. at 773.
100
Id. at 774 (holding that “[a]bsent evidence that the protesters’ speech is independently proscribable (i.e., ‘fighting words’ or threats), or is so infused with
violence as to be indistinguishable from a threat of physical harm, this provision cannot stand”).
101
Id. at 775.
102
Id. (offering some examples of narrower bans which would accomplish the
same or similar result, such as limitations on time and duration of picketing, as well
as the number of picketers).
103
See supra notes 85–101.
98
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Court in Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York. Chief Justice Rehnquist, again writing for the majority, reaffirmed the Madsen
105
test and upheld the implementation of a fixed buffer zone around
106
clinics, while striking down a floating buffer zone.
In its decision
that a floating, rather than a fixed, buffer zone was unconstitutional,
the Court determined that the uncertainty of where the zone reached
and extended was likely to burden more speech than necessary to
107
achieve the government’s interest.
Furthermore, the Court offered greater flexibility for the Madsen
test. The petitioners also challenged the injunction issued by the district court because the court did not attempt to issue a “non speech108
restrictive” injunction first, as the state court did in Madsen.
The
Court, however, explicitly said that it was not necessary to attempt a
“non-speech-restrictive” remedy before issuing a “speech-restrictive”
109
one. This flexibility in issuing an injunction or crafting a remedy is
important in providing a balance between protecting First Amendment freedoms and offering increased security. The Court attempted
to offer the government a variety of remedies to ensure safety, as long
as it utilized the least restrictive one. This effort is revealed by the
Court’s decision not to limit governments by requiring them to first
attempt the use of a “non-speech-restrictive” limitation before using a
110
“speech-restrictive” one.
111
In Hill v. Colorado, the Court addressed another First Amendment challenge that limited protesters’ access to public forums when
112
the forum they sought was an area outside of an abortion clinic. In
this case, however, the restriction challenged was a Colorado statute,

104

519 U.S. 357 (1997).
Id. at 370–71. The Court reaffirmed that the test in this context was not the
typical “time, place, and manner” test when the challenged restriction was an injunction. Id. “The test instead, we held, is ‘whether the challenged provisions of the
injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government
interest.’” Id. at 371 (quoting Madsen, 512 U.S. at 765).
106
Id. at 379. The floating buffer zone was a zone around any person entering or
exiting the clinic that any uninvited person was prohibited from entering. Id. at 378.
107
Schenck, 519 U.S. at 379. The Court cited a lack of certainty on the part of the
protesters about whether they were in compliance with the injunction or not. Id. at
378. “This lack of certainty leads to a substantial risk that much more speech will be
burdened than the injunction by its terms prohibits.” Id.
108
Id. at 382.
109
Id. at 382–83.
110
Id. at 382.
111
530 U.S. 703 (2000).
112
Id. at 707–08.
105
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rather than an injunction like in Madsen and Schenck.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, upheld the constitutionality of the
114
In doing so, he declined to extend Madsen’s requirement
statute.
of the least restrictive alternative outside the context of an injunc115
tion.
Although the Court declined to use the standard set forth in
Madsen as the test in Hill, its analysis indicated that the statute would
pass constitutional muster if viewed under a more scrutinizing lens.
For example, the majority mentioned restrictions that were upheld in
Madsen under its stricter test that were not present before the Court
in Hill, such as limitations on the number of speakers or sound am116
plification devices.
In fact, the majority even suggested that the
statute facilitated communication of the protesters’ message, rather
than hindering it, because it forced those protesters, whose aggressive
tactics discouraged thoughtful discussion, to tone down their ef117
Thus, although the Court declined to extend the more
forts.
rigorous standard set forth in Madsen, there is some evidence that the
statute would pass muster under the stricter level of scrutiny and still
allow the government to achieve the same end. The difference in the
application of tests may not affect the outcome in this case; however,
the Court’s decision in Hill, declining to extend the applicability of
Madsen, could have a bearing on future cases involving First Amendment challenges.
V. THE RESULT OF A FAILURE TO REQUIRE THE
LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE
Clearly, security concerns are very real. Because access to public
forums and the right of free speech are so fundamental to our ability
113

Id. at 707 (“The specific section of the statute that is challenged, COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-9-122(3) (1999), makes it unlawful within the regulated areas for any person to ‘knowingly approach’ within eight feet of another person, without that
person's consent, ‘for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a
sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with such other person . . . .’”).
114
Id. at 714.
115
Id. at 731 (holding “[i]t is precisely because the Colorado Legislature made a
general policy choice that the statute is assessed under the constitutional standard set
forth in Ward, . . . rather than a more strict standard” and citing Madsen as the guide
for this stricter standard).
116
Id. at 726–27 (citing the fact that the statute does not include the use of the
“floating buffer zones” the Court rejected in Schenck, as well as the inclusion of a
mens rea component for any protester who invades the space of a person seeking
treatment or care at the clinic).
117
Id. at 727.
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to self-govern, however, security concerns need to be tempered with
the ability to disseminate knowledge. The Supreme Court’s decision
in Ward did not require the use of the least restrictive alternative with
118
regard to limits on access to public forums; thus, current doctrine
does not provide a strong counter-balancing interest to such restrictions. With increasing safety concerns, many more restrictions on
valuable speech will become reasonable “time, place, and manner”
restrictions. Without a least restrictive alternative requirement, these
reasonable “time, place, and manner” restrictions could result in
swallowing valuable speech that should be protected by the First
Amendment.
119
Indeed, the concerns of the dissenting Justices in Clark and
120
121
Ward have played out to some extent in later case law.
The dissenting Justices in both cases feared that the constitutional standard
for judging these restrictions was too deferential to the govern122
ment.
It will be enough, therefore, that the challenged regulation
advances the government’s interest only in the slightest, for
any differential burden on speech that results does not enter the calculus. Despite its protestations to the contrary,
the majority thus has abandoned the requirement that restrictions on speech be narrowly tailored in any ordinary
123
use of the phrase.
The fact that the Court no longer required that the restrictions on
access to public forums be narrowly tailored makes it much easier for
the government to justify such regulations.
A. United for Peace and Justice v. City of New York

124

Prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, a coalition of local and national organizations wished to demonstrate against the war in front of
125
the United Nations in New York City.
When the City declined to
118

See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 782 (1989).
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 301–16 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
120
Ward, 491 U.S. at 803–12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
121
See infra notes 125–81 and accompanying text.
122
See Clark, 468 U.S. at 301 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Ward, 491 U.S. at 803
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority opinions in both cases significantly lowered the protection for important speech and fearing that the decisions
would result in the suppression of valuable speech).
123
Ward, 491 U.S. at 806 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
124
243 F. Supp. 2d 19 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
125
James Barron, Critical of Judge's Ruling, Antiwar Protesters Brace for Rally, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2003, at B1.
119
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issue a permit for this demonstration, the coalition challenged that
126
The disaction as a violation of their First Amendment freedoms.
trict court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction,
holding that the City’s action—preventing the demonstration at that
time and place—did not violate United for Peace and Justice’s First
127
In determining whether the City’s denial of a
Amendment rights.
permit infringed upon the group’s constitutional freedoms, the court
first noted the heightened awareness of security in Manhattan, and
128
specifically around the United Nations building, since 9/11. When
assessing whether the City’s restriction left open ample alternatives
for communication, the court pointed out different alternatives for
129
United for Peace and Justice, some of which were visible from the
130
United Nations Building.
Nevertheless, the court had little sympathy for the anti-war demonstration’s desire to be heard in front of the
131
Indeed, as an anti-war protest, a march in front of the
building.
United Nations building would have provided the demonstrators a
unique opportunity to communicate the group’s message, and the
court did not acknowledge the inadequacy of other possible fo132
rums.
The court assessed the City’s stationary rally alternative and
deemed that alternative to be an adequate substitute for the pro133
posed march. Furthermore, after examining the alternative modes
134
of communication, the court deemed them acceptable.
In concluding its opinion, the court cited to Ward, and used the Supreme
Court’s language for support that the alternative modes of communi135
cation need not be “the least restrictive alternative.”
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dis136
trict court’s decision.
The Second Circuit determined that while
the right to engage in political protest is protected, there are limits
137
When the court determined that the City’s offer of
on this right.
126

United for Peace and Justice, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 21.
Id. at 31.
128
Id. at 24.
129
Id. at 25.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
See generally, Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (discussing how confining protesters in certain spaces has damaging
effects on expressive conduct).
133
United for Peace and Justice, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 29.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 32 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 782 (1989)).
136
United for Peace and Justice v. City of New York, 323 F.3d 175, 176 (2d Cir.
2003).
137
Id. at 176.
127
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the stationary rally was appropriate the court also concluded that it
138
was narrowly tailored, albeit not the least restrictive alternative.
The Second Circuit also cited Ward for support in its decision that
while the City’s restrictions needed to be narrowly tailored, “they
‘need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means’ of regulat139
The court also agreed with the district court’s
ing speech.”
conclusion that the City’s decision to prohibit a march in favor of the
140
stationary rally was proper. The Second Circuit defended the decision:
This case, and the district court’s decision, are not as unusual or as unprecedented as some have suggested. . . . We
are ever mindful of our role in the preservation of our system of ordered liberty, especially in times of war. Not every
regulation or governmental action designed to protect the
public safety will necessarily win the imprimatur of the
141
courts.
Although the court attempted to reassure itself and others that there
will still be adequate protection for fundamental First Amendment
freedoms, such as the right of political protest, the ultimate outcome
of the case is unsettling. The court’s decision gives reason for apprehension because it illustrates the ability of security concerns to
squelch potentially valuable political speech, without even an investigation into how such speech could be conveyed in a safe manner.
Although both courts cited to other First Amendment decisions
by the Supreme Court, the decision in Ward validated the district
court and the Second Circuit’s less rigorous inquiries into the alter142
This sort of repression is
natives the City offered to the protesters.
particularly troubling in a time leading up to our decision to invade
another country, and could potentially infringe upon our ability to
143
self-govern.

138

Id. at 177.
Id. (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 798)
140
Id.
141
Id. at 177–78.
142
United for Peace and Justice v. City of New York, 243 F. Supp. 2d 19, 32
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
143
See Nick Suplina, Note, Crowd Control: The Troubling Mix of First Amendment Law,
Political Demonstrations, and Terrorism, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 395 (2005) (addressing
the inadequacy of the time, place, and manner standard in protecting protests); see
also Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin & Matthew L. Schwartz, With All Due Deference: Judicial
Responsibility in a Time of Crisis, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 795 (2004) (arguing that the
courts should not immediately defer to other branches of government during times
of war).
139
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B. National Council of Arab Americans v. City of New York

144

The Republican National Convention generated another example of the tension between the concerns for security and the right of
access to public forums. Before the convention, demonstrators pro145
tested the Bush Administration and its policies. For example, prior
to the convention, the police in New York arrested more than one
hundred protesters on bicycles who were riding to express disap146
The
proval of the Administration’s treatment of the environment.
National Council of Arab Americans and United for Peace and Justice both sought large venues for demonstrations in Central Park
147
The New York City Parks Department
held on consecutive days.
denied each of their requests for a permit, as well as the respective
148
United for Peace and Justice initially accepted the West
appeals.
Side Highway as an alternate site for its march, but then rejected the
alternative when the City refused to supply certain amenities like wa149
ter and shuttle buses.
The media followed the struggle between the City and the protest groups. Two general opinions emerged. One point of view was
that the City was trying to manage the protests too closely, and by limiting them to such a great degree, removed the power of the
150
Others, however, felt that the protesters had their day in
protest.
151
court and that the rights of the protesters must not outweigh the
152
Thus, it was up to the courts to determine
rights of other citizens.
153
whether to allow the protests to take place.
144

331 F. Supp. 2d 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
See infra notes 146–52 and accompanying text.
146
Randal C. Archibold, 100 Cyclists Are Arrested as Thousands Ride in Protest, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 28, 2004, at B1.
147
Id.
148
Susan Saulny, Judge Bars Big Rally in Park, but Protest March Is Still Set, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 26, 2004, at B1.
149
Id.
150
Michael Slackman, If a Protest Is Planned to a T, Is It a Protest?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
22, 2004, at 4.1 (“But for the protest groups, Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg might as
well be Mayor Richard J. Daley of Chicago in 1968. Billyclub or no billyclub, they
claim, his aim is to block dissent, to sanitize and strip it of all meaning.”).
151
Editorial, Sunday in the Park, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2004, at A20 (cautioning
demonstrators that frustration over the courts’ rulings were not an excuse for lawlessness).
152
Slackman, supra note 150, at 4.1 (“The city takes the view that it is simply trying
to accommodate the protesters while at the same time safeguarding everyone else.
The New York Police Department said it thought that it had achieved a reasonable
compromise in allowing protesters to march past Madison Square Garden and still
gather in large numbers in the street.”).
153
See infra notes 154–81.
145
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Two groups of protesters filed a motion for preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of the park’s permit scheme, and the
district court consolidated the complaints into a single action by both
National Council of Arab Americans and Act Now to Stop War and
154
End Racism (ANSWER).
The formal grounds for the Parks Department’s denial of the
National Council of Arab Americans’ permit request was that the
Great Lawn in Central Park had just been restored, and the space was
155
not large enough to hold all of the protesters. The plaintiffs countered by stressing the unique significance of demonstrating on the
156
Great Lawn on August 28, 2004. First, the coincidence of the demonstrations in time and space with the Republican National
Convention would make the protest more powerful at the desired lo157
cation than at another location. Second, the date marked the fortyfirst anniversary of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s march on Washing158
ton, D.C.
Finally, the forum had a history of protest without
violence, and the Great Lawn was a historic place for people seeking
159
justice in a non-violent fashion.
Some of the alternative sites that the Parks Department offered
included forums outside Manhattan, such as in Queens or the
160
Bronx.
The plaintiffs argued that the Great Lawn, if available, was
161
The Departthe “only appropriate place” for the demonstration.
ment did offer another venue within Central Park, but one that could
accommodate no more than 50,000 people, a number much smaller
162
In response to this offer,
than the plaintiffs’ anticipated turnout.
the plaintiffs again argued that the only location that was proper for
their rally was the Great Lawn: “Plaintiffs argue that assembly on the
Great Lawn is part of their political message, namely acceptance and
163
equality of Arab Americans.” While the court noted this part of the
Council’s argument, it placed little emphasis on it in reaching a final
164
conclusion.
154

Nat’l Council of Arab Ams. v. City of New York, 331 F. Supp. 2d 258, 260, 262
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
155
Id. at 261.
156
Id. at 262–63.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 262.
159
Id. at 263.
160
Nat’l Council of Arab Ams., 331 F. Supp. 2d at 263.
161
Id.
162
Id. at 262, 264.
163
Id. at 263.
164
Id. at 265–73.
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The Parks Department also advanced justifications for refusing
165
the Council’s use of the Great Lawn.
Most importantly, the De166
partment cited concern for damage to the newly restored ground.
The defendants also hinted at concern over security as a justification
for denying the permit, but did not clearly state it as a reason for the
167
denial. The fact that the mere “allusion” to security concerns offers
a significant justification for denial of the plaintiff’s permit underscores the power of such a justification in the “time, place, and
manner” restrictions on speech.
The district court concluded that the Parks Department’s restriction on speech was narrowly tailored: “The Parks Department’s
determination is not unconstitutional simply because this Court
might have promoted the governmental interest in a different man168
ner or can conceive of some ‘less-speech-restrictive alternative.’”
Thus, the court decided it was not responsible for finding a way to allow this speech to take place at a venue the plaintiffs deemed
uniquely appropriate for their event. National Council of Arab Americans shows how the protection for speech becomes more limited
when the court does not require the government to employ the least
restrictive alternative in its restriction of access to public forums.
A parallel state court case was decided just after National Council
169
of Arab Americans. In United for Peace and Justice v. Bloomberg, a New
York state court also denied the plaintiff’s application for a prelimi170
nary injunction.
In its decision, the court followed some of the
same reasoning of National Council of Arab Americans, but also seemed
frustrated with United for Peace and Justice’s delay in filing its suit,
171
accusing the plaintiff of coming to the court with “unclean hands.”
In addressing the plaintiff’s First Amendment claims, the court, citing
Ward, found that the permit guidelines did not unnecessarily burden
172
the plaintiff’s right to speech.

165

Id. at 261.
Nat’l Council of Arab Ams., 331 F. Supp. 2d at 261.
167
Id. at 265 (“Defendants also have alluded to certain security concerns over having the Great Lawn used for demonstrations.”).
168
Id. at 270 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799–800
(1989)).
169
783 N.Y.S.2d 255 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
170
Id. at 257.
171
Id. at 259 (“Although plaintiff comes to court seeking equity, the above chronology establishes plaintiff does not come to court with ‘clean hands,’ because
plaintiff is guilty of inexcusable and inequitable delay.”).
172
Id. at 262.
166
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The Bloomberg court further addressed United for Peace and Justice’s complaints about the alternate location of West Street for its
173
rally. The plaintiff argued that the line of sight would be poor from
174
this venue, resulting in its message not being adequately conveyed.
Although the court recognized this problem, it gave little weight to
175
The court determined that these problems would exist even if
it.
United for Peace and Justice received a permit for their desired three
176
sites in Central Park.
The Bloomberg court, however, simply did not
accord special significance to the fact that the main portion of the
rally would still occur on the Great Lawn, which had special import
177
When first employing the
for conveying the plaintiff’s message.
Madsen test, the United States Supreme Court gave significantly more
weight to whether the protesters at abortion clinics could effectively
communicate their message than the New York court gave to the
178
plaintiff’s claims in Bloomberg. For example, the Bloomberg court determined it had no obligation to ensure that the plaintiff maximized
the number of participants, its audience or its media exposure by at179
By
tempting to accommodate the plaintiff at the desired site.
contrast, the Madsen court gave these objectives more serious consid180
eration and attention.
The Bloomberg court repeatedly expressed frustration at the
plaintiff’s delay in seeking judicial relief in its opinion, denying
United for Peace and Justice’s request for a preliminary injunction.
When reprimanding the plaintiff for its delay, however, the court
stated that the plaintiff’s desire for a rally in Central Park could have
been accommodated if United for Peace and Justice had promptly
181
sought judicial intervention.
Although the court faulted the plaintiff for waiting to bring the action, its admission of the likelihood that

173

Id. at 262–63.
Id. at 263.
175
Bloomberg, 783 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
176
Id. (noting that “[c]ertainly, the problems plaintiff suggests with the line of
sight along West Street are no greater than those presented by plaintiff's proposed
event on three Central Park sites, two of which are separated from the Great Lawn by
approximately one mile (and the Central Park Reservoir)”).
177
Id.
178
See supra notes 81–98 and accompanying text.
179
Bloomberg, 783 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
180
See supra notes 81–102 and accompanying text.
181
Bloomberg, 783 N.Y.S.2d at 259 (“Indeed, it is this Court's opinion that if plaintiff had filed the instant application in a timely fashion, operational plans could have
been implemented to accommodate plaintiff's desire for a rally in Central Park, with
adequate protection for the public and preserving the integrity of the park lands.”).
174
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the plaintiff’s event could be accommodated supports the conclusion
that there is a less burdensome alternative than the current method.
VI. THE APPLICATION OF THE MADSEN TEST BEYOND THE REALM OF
INJUNCTIONS AND THE ABORTION CLINIC PROBLEM
The City of New York has struggled with the appropriate way to
accommodate protests because of the tension between allowing peo182
ple to be heard and keeping the city safe and functioning.
As
previously discussed, prior to the Republican National Convention,
the City was confronted with another protest in which the petitioners
wished to march past the United Nations building in opposition to
183
the pending war in Iraq.
In looking to potential alternatives, the
City flatly refused to consider a march in any area of the city, in spite
184
of the petitioner’s offer to consider alternate routes for the march.
The City also denied this option in spite of the fact that it allowed
185
other parades and marches to continue in the city. When it denied
United for Peace and Justice’s request, the City cited a lack of adequate preparation time and distinguished the protest from annual
186
parade events for which the City claimed were easier to plan.
Had the district court applied the Madsen test to the City’s denial
of the petitioner’s permit request and evaluated whether the regulation or guideline “burdened no more speech than necessary to serve
a significant government interest,” the court would likely have arrived
at a different result than it did utilizing the more deferential standard
set forth in Ward. First, the court would engage in an analysis of
whether the least restrictive alternative had been applied, rather than
simply citing to Ward when it determined that the regulation left
187
open ample alternative channels for communication. For example,
in evaluating the proposed alternative of a stationary rally, the district
court concluded that it was enough that the protesters would still be
182

See supra Part V and accompanying text for a discussion of the City’s attempts
to balance these interests.
183
See supra notes 124–43 and accompanying text.
184
United for Peace and Justice v. City of New York, 243 F. Supp. 2d 19, 21
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“While Plaintiff has not specifically offered to forego its march past
the United Nations, as late as the evening of February 7, after an evidentiary hearing,
Plaintiff was willing to discuss alternate march routes. The City, however, was then
and remains unequivocal in its position that it will not permit a march past the
United Nations—or a march anywhere in Manhattan—in connection with the event,
principally because of safety and security considerations.”).
185
Id. at 26. The City continued to allow events such as the Dominican Day parade, the Saint Patrick’s Day Parade, and the Puerto Rican Day Parade. Id.
186
Id. at 26–27.
187
Id. at 30.
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visible from the United Nations building.
The Madsen court, however, when reviewing the constitutionality of the buffer zones outside
of abortion clinics, paid special attention to the fact that the protest189
ers could still be seen and heard from outside the buffer zone.
Under the more deferential standard, there is no real concern for the
fact that United for Peace and Justice’s message could only be observed, rather than actually heard.
Furthermore, in assessing the potential viability of certain alternatives, the court made a very cursory inquiry. When it addressed the
possibility of a buffer zone, the court took the police chief’s word that
190
Alit would be difficult for such a buffer zone to be effective.
though the buffer zones at abortion clinics sought to contain smaller
crowds than the march proposed by United for Peace and Justice,
there was little investigation as to how the six-lane road outside the
United Nations building could be used to effectively secure the building while still allowing the protesters their fullest opportunity for
demonstration.
In addition, the City refused to allow any sort of parade or
march in the city, although it granted such permits to other groups
191
for cultural events.
While the City explained that these events differed because they were annual and allowed it more time to
192
prepare, the fact that it regularly allows such events underscores
the fact that the City and its police force are capable of controlling
large, moving events, and therefore have mechanisms in place for
these types of events. This evidence supports the notion that there
could be another, less restrictive alternative available for United for
Peace and Justice rather than a total ban on the march or any sort of
mobile demonstration. Not only could the City attempt to use these
mechanisms outside the context of parades related to cultural events
and holidays, but it could also adopt a “facilitation” approach to
demonstration. This approach allows demonstrators to protest relatively undisturbed unless they break laws, and has been used in San
193
Francisco with positive results.

188

See supra notes 127–35 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text.
190
United for Peace and Justice, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 25.
191
Id. at 25–26.
192
Id. at 26.
193
NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL, COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, RES. CALLING
UPON GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO PROTECT AND UPHOLD FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO
FREEDOM OF SPEECH, ASSOCIATION AND ASSEMBLY (2004), available at http://webdocs.
nyccouncil.info/attachments/61403.htm.
189
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The application of the Madsen test to National Council of Arab
Americans would also likely produce a different result. If the district
court applied the Madsen test to the Council’s petition for a preliminary injunction, the court would ask whether the Parks Department’s
permit scheme burdened more speech than necessary to achieve the
194
government’s objective.
Because the Parks Department refused to
grant a permit, the court would inquire whether the City’s stated objectives, preserving the Great Lawn and providing security, could be
195
accomplished in another way.
The City repeatedly stated its concern for weather conditions
during the rally and the impact of a large assemblage of people on
196
the Great Lawn if the weather was bad.
Although the Council and
the other groups that joined in the action could not practically have a
rain date for their demonstration, the Parks Department gave no
consideration to a conditional permit and offered the petitioners a
rain site, rather than a rain date. Furthermore, the sites the Parks
Department did offer as alternatives were inadequate substitutes and
would not pass under the Madsen test because the alternative sites
gave little consideration to whether the protesters’ ideas and message
197
The alternate sites the City proffered to the
would still be heard.
protesters included Flushing Meadow Park in Queens and Van Cort198
landt Park in the Bronx.
The offer of alternative sites outside
Manhattan showed little sensitivity to the petitioners’ desire to be
seen and heard in the center of the city. Placing the site outside of
the city tucks away the protesters and their message, an effect the
Madsen test attempts to prevent.
VII. CONCLUSION
Since the Ward decision and other decisions that preceded it,
such as Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, there has been
concern about the application of a standard that does not require the
least restrictive alternative when suppressing speech in public forums.
Some scholars have advocated a required use of the least restrictive
199
alternative for all forms of speech, whether they are political or not.
194

Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994).
Nat’l Council of Arab Ams. v. City of New York, 331 F. Supp. 2d 258, 261
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
196
Id. at 261, 263–64.
197
See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text.
198
Nat’l Council for Arab Ams., 331 F. Supp. 2d at 262.
199
See generally Paul A. Blechner, First Amendment: Supreme Court Rejection of the Least
Restrictive Alternative Test, 1990 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 331, 356–57 (arguing for more protection for First Amendment freedoms: “Such a large measure of trust accorded to
195
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Such a requirement, however, fails to take into account the important
security concerns that exist today. Thus, a standard that would account for the type of speech, as well as the government’s regulation
200
Because the self-government jusof it, would be most appropriate.
tification for First Amendment rights is the most widely agreed
201
upon, the court should scrutinize the regulation of such speech in
public forums most carefully and require that the government burden no more speech than necessary in order to accomplish its
202
The free exchange of ideas and information is vital to
objective.
the legitimate functioning of democracy, and therefore any interference with such communication deserves careful scrutiny. This
standard was used in the challenges at abortion clinics. In applying
such a standard, there would be the hope that the Court’s vision of
public forums as articulated in Hague, that the parks and streets of
203
this country are still held in trust by the people for their use, would
still be a viable goal. The inadequacy of the current standard was revealed in the United for Peace and Justice and National Council of Arab
Americans decisions when potentially valuable political speech was
suppressed during tumultuous times. The court’s lack of inquiry into
potentially less restrictive alternatives exposed the insufficiency of this
standard. Offering this enhanced protection for political speech
would potentially strike a balance between enhancing the nation’s
safety and still preserving its citizens’ liberty.

legislators cannot be justified when [F]irst [A]mendment rights are at stake. Where
speech is of any protected category, the [F]irst [A]mendment requires that the legislative branch be held to a more stringent standard. The judiciary must protect this
level of protection by acting as an anti-majoritarian body.”).
200
But see id. at 360 (arguing that “[e]ven though requiring an equal nexus between regulation and interest may appear to be an overly broad prophylactic
measure, providing protection for lesser protected speech is nevertheless necessary
because (1) lesser types of speech are still protected speech, and (2) a weaker nexus
creates opportunities for content-based regulations to be hidden under the guise of
content-neutral regulations”).
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